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PERFORAOE OF A& PRE-EXISTnG CONTRACT AS CONSIDERA-
TION.-Donnelly v. Newbold (Court of Appeals of Maryland,
Oct. Term, 1901). Assumpsit. The appellee, Newbold, in writ-
ing guaranteed to appellants payment for a lot of bricks which
appellants had contracted or were about to contract to sell to one
Smith, a lessee of appellee. Court below held that the guaranty
was collateral, and as Newbold had not been notified of accept-
ance of his offer he was not liable. Davis v. Richards, 115 U. S.
524, 1885; Bishop v. Baton, 161 Mass 498, 1894.
The Court of- Appeals found that the wording of the guar-
anty itself was equivocal, and remanded the case to have ascer-
tained by the jury as a matter of fact whether it was collateral
or original. The interesting point of the case is'the question of
consideration for Iewbold's promise. The court held, "In
either event the guaranty would rest upon a sufficient considera-
tion, for in the first case it would have formned the inducement
which led the appellants to make the sale, and even in the
555
NOTES.
second case the fact which appears on the face of the guaranty
that the appellee was interested in the land which was to b
improved by the use of the bricks constituted a consideration
sufficient to support the guaranty."
The second alternative expresses a doctrine contrary to the
majority of American decisions. In this country it has generally
been held that the performance of a pre-existing contract duty
with another party is no consideration for a promise. Arend v.
Smith, 151 N. Y. 502, 1897; Robinson v. Jewett, 116 N. Y. 40,
1889; Merrick v. Criddings, 1 Mackey, D. 0. 394, 1882; Havana
v. Ashurst, 148 Il. 115, 1894; Wimer v. Worth Township, 104
Pa. 317, 1883.
The opposite rule is held in England, in the leading cases
of Shadwell v. Shadwell, 30 L. J. R., C. P. 145, 1861, and Scot-
son v. Pegg, 6 H. & N. 2P5, 1861. These cases proceed on the
ground that by doing the act at request of the promisor the
promisee has waived the right which he previously had in con-
junction with his original fellow-contractor to rescind the con-
tract, and therefore has given consideration to the promisor, who,
of course, derived a benefit from the performance of the contract.
This English doctrine is upheld in a Massachusetts case, Abbot
v. Doane, 163 Mass. 433, 1895, where it is plainly stated that if
A. has contracted with B., and C., who is interested in the
undertaking, offers to pay A. if he perform it, and A. does so,
the I~rformance by A. is sufficient consideration for C.'s promise.
Therefore, if A. does not perform the act, C.'s offer is simply
unaccepted. But if A. does the act he has fulfilled C.'s require-
ments, C. has obtained what he desired and is bound.
This decision is in line with the view that consideration is any
act or forbearance or promise by one person given in exchange
for the promise of another, Harvard Law Review, XII 516. In
this article Professor Ames rejects the definition that detriment
to the promise must be other than the fulfillment of a legal duty.
If detriment be taken in the restricted sense of the definition,
then there is no consideration in -doing what one was already
bound to another party to do, and the English cases are wrongly
decided. But apart from the conflict of cases there is a practical
reason why consideration should not be so restricted.
The broad doctrine of consideration is stated much more
decisively in the Massachusetts case than in Shadwell v. Shad-
well, but it amounts to the same in the end, and does not involve
the rather indirect reasoning given in the English case. It may
well be true that the consideration for the new promise lies in
the fact that by doing the act the promisee has waived a right
and has thereby suffered a detriment. This is the reasoning of
the English judges. But aside from this 6ircumlocution, why
should the new promisor not be bound?- Suppose A. promises
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has bound himself to two parties, both contracts are bi-lateral,
and both B. and 0. may sue A. on breach. But Sir William
Anson says that it is unwarranted to assume that an action
would lie by A. against 0. on such a promise, for the reason that
A. was already bound to do the act. That is true, but before he
was bound to B. only, now he is bound to 0. also, to whom he
was not bound before, and the consideration for C.'s promise is
A.'s promise to perform to him. This much is admitted by one
American case, Merrick, v. Giddings, which, however, limits it
to cases where there is a promise given, and excludes cases where
the act is done without a previous promise to do so. So much
for additional bi-lateral contracts.
The same reasoning applies to cases similar to this Maryland
one where the additional contract is uni-lateral, where O. prom-
ises to A. if he perform his existing contract with B., and A.,
without promising, does perform it. In the Maryland case, pro-
ceeding upon the second alternative state of facts, Newbold
promises to pay Donnelly if Donnelly would perform his existing
contract with Smith to deliver bricks. Donnelly made no prom-
ise to Newbold, but did deliver the bricks to Smith. By this
act Newbold's offer is accepted and he is bound, providing, of
course, that his offer was original, for if collateral he is not
bound, as no notice was given. But original or collateral, there
is consideration for his promise. Donnelly has done what New-
bold offered to pay him for, Newbold has obtained what he
desired, and the fact that Donnelly had previously contracted
with Smith to do the same thing does not obviate the fact that
Newbold has been given valuable consideration for his promise.
The weight of authority in American decisions is admittedly
against this view. In Robinson v. Jewett, 116 N. Y. 40, 1889,
it is said, "The performance of an act which the party is under
a legal obligation to perform cannot constitute a consideration
for a new contract." This statement epitomizes American deci-
sions on the subject.. Yet, from a practical standpoint, there is
no reason why the English rule is not the better one. The only
ground on which the other rests is a mere technicality, the sole
result of which is to restrict beyond all reasonable limits freedom
of contract. If it is to the interests of business to enter into addi-
tional bi-lateral or uni-lateral contracts of this kind, it is not just
that an arbitrary technicality should prevent it. If one desires to
obtain a legal interest in an already-existing contract it is but
reasonable that he be permitted to do so, in circumstances similar
to the preceding cases.
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